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35 
WOOLLARD v. GALLAGHER: NORMALIZING THE FOURTH 
CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO SECOND AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGES 
WILLIAM YOUNG, JR.∗ 
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution preserves 
the individual right to keep and bear arms.1  This right, however, is in con-
flict with the problem of handgun violence in the United States.  In an at-
tempt to alleviate this tension, the State of Maryland devised a handgun-
permitting scheme that, while preventing most citizens from carrying hand-
guns in public, allowed those citizens with a “good and substantial reason” 
to do so.2  In Woollard v. Gallagher,3 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, facing a Second Amendment challenge to Mary-
land’s permitting scheme, upheld the good-and-substantial-reason require-
ment.4  Drawing from its Second Amendment jurisprudence,5 the Fourth 
Circuit engaged in a straightforward application of precedent to an issue of 
first impression.6  The court’s decision is consistent with the opinions of 
other federal circuit courts of appeals.7  While the scope of the Second 
Amendment right, as expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
remains uncertain, handgun-permitting schemes that grant permits to those 
with a documented, articulable need for self-protection should withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. 
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 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. II; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) 
(“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment 
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”). 
 2.  See infra Part I. 
 3.  712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). 
 4.  See infra Part III. 
 5.  See infra Part II. 
 6.  See infra Part III. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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I. THE CASE 
Maryland’s regulatory framework renders it unlawful to carry a hand-
gun, concealed or otherwise, outside of one’s home without a permit.8  To 
obtain a permit, an individual must submit an application to the Secretary of 
the State Police.9  The Handgun Permit Unit, acting as the Secretary’s de-
signee, conducts an investigation of the applicant to ensure that he or she 
satisfies the conditions prescribed by Maryland law.10  Chief among these 
conditions is the requirement that “the applicant ‘has good and substantial 
reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun.’”11  Provided an individual 
meets the enumerated conditions, the Secretary is required to issue that in-
dividual a permit.12  If the Secretary denies an application, the applicant 
may appeal the decision to the Handgun Permit Review Board.13  The Re-
view Board may sustain, reverse, or modify the Permit Unit’s decision.14 
On December 24, 2002, Raymond Woollard was at home with his 
wife, children, and grandchildren when an intruder broke in by shattering a 
window.15  Woollard retrieved a shotgun and aimed it at the intruder, but 
the intruder was able to wrestle away the shotgun.16  Using a second gun, 
Woollard’s son was able to detain the intruder while the family waited two-
and-a-half hours for the police to arrive.17 
After the incident, Woollard applied for, and the Secretary granted, a 
permit to carry a handgun.18  In 2006, shortly after the intruder was released 
from incarceration, the Permit Unit allowed Woollard to renew his permit.19  
In 2009, however, the Permit Unit denied Woollard’s second renewal appli-
                                                          
 8.  See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203 (LexisNexis 2012); Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 
F. Supp. 2d 462, 464 (D. Md. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). 
 9.  Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 465. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011)).  Other 
notable factors include “‘whether the applicant has any alternative available to him for protection 
other than a handgun permit,’ and ‘whether the permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution for 
the applicant against apprehended danger.’”  Id. (quoting MD. CODE REGS. 29.03.02.04L, 
29.03.02.04O (2010)). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-312 (LexisNexis 2011)). 
 14.  Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-312 (LexisNexis 2011)). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id.  The intruder, Woollard’s son-in-law Kris Abbott, received three years’ probation for 
first-degree burglary and ultimately was incarcerated after violating that probation.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id.  Specifically, “[p]ermits expire ‘on the last day of the holder’s birth month following 
two years after the date the permit is issued’ and may be renewed for successive three-year terms.”  
Id. at 465 n.4 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-309 (LexisNexis 2011)). 
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cation because he was unable to provide evidence of a current threat to sub-
stantiate his purported apprehended fear.20  Woollard’s attempt to have the 
decision overturned through the administrative review process proved un-
successful.21  The Review Board concluded “that Woollard ‘ha[d] not 
demonstrated a good and substantial reason to wear, carry or transport a 
handgun as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.’”22 
Abandoning his appeal effort, Woollard, joined by the Second 
Amendment Foundation, filed suit against the Secretary and three members 
of the Review Board in the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland on the grounds that Maryland’s statutory scheme violated the 
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.23  Both sides moved 
for summary judgment based on the undisputed facts of the case.24  The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in Woollard’s favor, finding that in-
termediate scrutiny applied,25 that the right to bear arms is not confined to 
the home, and that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement was not 
reasonably adapted to a substantial government interest.26  The Secretary 
and Review Board members appealed the district court’s decision to the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, presenting the issue of whether Mary-
land’s good-and-substantial-reason requirement burdens conduct protected 
by the Second Amendment and, if so, whether the requirement withstands 
constitutional scrutiny.27 
                                                          
 20.  Id. at 465. 
 21.  Id. at 465–66. 
 22.  Id. at 466 (alteration in original) (quoting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Ex-
hibit D at 3, Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462 (No. 1:10-cv-2068), ECF No. 12-6). 
 23.  Id.  Notwithstanding any concern over the intruder, Woollard asserted a desire to wear 
and carry a handgun outside of his home for general self-defense.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 464. 
 25.  The traditional forms of tiered scrutiny, applied in constitutional challenges to supposed-
ly burdensome government actions, are strict, intermediate, and rational basis scrutiny.  Calvin 
Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 949–51 
(2004).  Strict scrutiny is applied to highly suspect classifications, such as those “that materially 
infringe on fundamental constitutional liberties . . . (for due process purposes, those that are deep-
ly rooted in our history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . .).”  Id. at 
949 (footnotes omitted).  To survive strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the classifica-
tion is necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental objective.  Id.  Intermediate scrutiny, 
applied to moderately suspect classifications, determines whether the classification is substantially 
related to the accomplishment of an important government objective.  Id. at 950 (citation omit-
ted).  Finally, rational basis scrutiny, the default level of scrutiny, is applied to non-suspect gov-
ernment actions that are presumed valid and “the challenger of the action [must] prove . . . that 
either the government has no legitimate purpose for its action or that the action is not rationally 
related to the accomplishment of any legitimate purpose.”  Id. at 951. 
 26.  Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 464, 471. 
 27.  Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 873 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013).  
On September 9, 2013, approximately six months after the Fourth Circuit rendered its opinion, the 
intruder, Kris Abbott, was “involved in a domestic dispute with his estranged wife, Dawn Abbott, 
45, and his parents . . . .  During the dispute, police said, he pushed Dawn Abbott to the ground, 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”28  The 
Supreme Court of the United States has established that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms—
unconnected to militia service—for self-defense inside the home; and that 
this proscription applies equally to the federal and state governments.29  
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit developed a two-part inquiry for Second 
Amendment challenges to firearms statutes.30  The U.S. Courts of Appeals 
for the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have applied a similar 
framework when faced with Second Amendment challenges to state fire-
arms permitting regimes.31  The Supreme Court’s announcement of a new 
right, coupled with its failure to provide clear standards of review, has re-
sulted in the void that the lower courts have attempted to fill.32 
A. The Second Amendment’s Resurgence in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the National Fire-
arms Act33 in United States v. Miller.34  The defendants were charged with 
transporting in interstate commerce a short-barreled shotgun without the 
appropriate documentation in violation of the Act.35  Reviewing the consti-
tutionality of this Act, the Supreme Court performed a historical analysis to 
discern the Second Amendment’s original meaning,36 and concluded that 
the Amendment’s protection extends to weapons in common use at the time 
of ratification.37  The Court held that, without evidence showing that the 
                                                          
damaged a vehicle with a metal pipe, and then used the pipe to assault both of his parents.”  Jessi-
ca Anderson, Man Dead After Barricade Was at Center of Md. Handgun Suit, BALT. SUN, Sept. 
11, 2013, at 1A.  Following the dispute, Kris Abbott barricaded himself inside the home and fatal-
ly shot himself.  Id. 
 28.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 29.  See infra Part II.A. 
 30.  See infra Part II.B. 
 31.  See infra Part II.C. 
 32.  See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 33.  Ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872 (2012)).  
 34.  307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 35.  Id. at 175. 
 36.  Id. at 178 (“With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the ef-
fectiveness of [the Militia] the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It 
must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”). 
 37.  See id. at 179–82 (“The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the de-
bates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of ap-
proved commentators.  These show plainly enough . . . that ordinarily when called for service 
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weapon at issue bore “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or 
efficiency of a well-regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second 
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”38  
The Court further asserted that it was “not within judicial notice that th[e] 
weapon [was] part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could 
[have] contribute[d] to the common defense.”39 
The Court did not revisit Second Amendment jurisprudence until al-
most seventy years later in District of Columbia v. Heller,40 where the 
Court performed its “first in-depth examination of the Second Amend-
ment.”41  In Heller, the respondents challenged the constitutionality of the 
District of Columbia’s firearms regulations that generally prohibited the 
possession of handguns and required any “lawfully owned firearms, such as 
registered long guns, [to be] ‘unloaded and disassembled or bound by a 
trigger lock or similar device.’”42  Because the Second Amendment was the 
codification of a pre-existing right, the Court performed a textual and his-
torical inquiry to determine the Second Amendment’s original public mean-
ing at the time it was ratified.43  This inquiry led the Court to conclude “that 
the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear 
arms” and self-defense was the central component of that right.44  The 
Court conceded that it did “not undertake an exhaustive historical analy-
sis . . . of the full scope of the Second Amendment” and recognized that the 
right was not unlimited.45  Presaging its next Second Amendment case, the 
Court noted that it had not yet recognized the Fourteenth Amendment to in-
corporate Second Amendment protections.46 
                                                          
these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in com-
mon use at the time.”). 
 38.  Id. at 178 (emphasis added). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 41.  Id. at 635. 
 42.  Id. at 575 (citations omitted). 
 43.  Id. at 592–93. 
 44.  Id. at 595, 599. 
 45.  Id. at 626.  The Court also noted “we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the 
right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.”  Id. at 595.  Moreover, the Court add-
ed: 
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carry-
ing of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 
Id. at 626–27.  The Second Amendment’s protection is limited to “the sorts of weapons . . . ‘in 
common use at the time’” the states ratified the Amendment.  Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
 46.  See id. at 620 n.23 (“With respect to Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation, a 
question not presented by this case, we note that [United States v.] Cruikshank[, 92 U.S. 542 
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Applying its conclusion to the District of Columbia’s handgun ban, the 
Court held that “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have ap-
plied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most 
preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s 
home and family’ would fail constitutional muster.”47  The Court further 
held unconstitutional the District of Columbia’s requirement that lawful 
“firearms in the home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times” because 
“[t]his makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful pur-
pose of self-defense.”48  The Court did not articulate the level of scrutiny 
with which to evaluate laws burdening Second Amendment conduct,49 but it 
limited the rigor to one of the heightened standards of scrutiny.50  The Court 
concluded that, regardless of the Second Amendment’s scope, “it surely el-
evates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens 
to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”51 
Two years later, the Court revisited the Heller decision in McDonald 
v. City of Chicago.52  Faced with a statutory scheme similar to that in Hel-
ler,53 the issue presented was whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorpo-
rated the Second Amendment as the Court left open in Heller.54  The Court 
found “that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted 
the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary 
to our system of ordered liberty.”55  Accordingly, the Court held “that the 
                                                          
(1876),] also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not engage in 
the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases.  Our later decisions in 
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886), and Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894), reaf-
firmed that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government.”). 
 47.  Id. at 628–29 (footnote and citation omitted).  The Court also noted that “the need for 
defense of self, family, and property is most acute” in the home.  Id. at 628. 
 48.  Id. at 630. 
 49.  The dissenting Justices were critical of the Court for establishing a “new” constitutional 
right without providing guidance to lower courts with respect to that right’s scope or the applica-
ble standard of review.  Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 50.  See id. at 628 n.27 (majority opinion) (“Obviously, [rational-basis scrutiny] could not be 
used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it 
the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to 
keep and bear arms.  If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a 
rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohi-
bitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.” (citation omitted)). 
 51.  Id. at 635. 
 52.  130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 53.  Id. at 3026. 
 54.  Id. at 3028.  The petitioners argued that “the Chicago and Oak Park laws violate[d] the 
right to keep and bear arms for two reasons.”  Id.  The petitioners’ “primary submission [was] that 
this right is among the ‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States’ and that the nar-
row interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause adopted in the Slaughter–House Cas-
es . . . should now be rejected.  As a secondary argument, petitioners contend[ed] that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause ‘incorporates’ the Second Amendment right.”  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 3042. 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second 
Amendment right recognized in Heller.”56  In so holding, the Court restated 
its holding in Heller, but did not expound upon it.57  Underscoring limita-
tions to the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller, the Court stated, 
“incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”58  The 
Court made clear, however, that the Second Amendment right, among other 
considerations, was “valued because the possession of firearms was thought 
to be essential for self-defense . . . [and] self-defense was ‘the central com-
ponent of the right itself.’”59 
B. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Developed Its Second 
Amendment Framework Through Constitutional Challenges to 
Federal Statutes 
The Fourth Circuit developed its Second Amendment jurisprudence 
through constitutional challenges to provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)60 and 
a challenge to 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b).61  The challenged provisions of Section 
922(g) make it unlawful for certain classes of people to possess firearms or 
ammunition, and persons within these classifications have challenged the 
statute insofar as it prevents them from possessing a firearm for self-defense 
within the home.62  The challenged regulation, 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b), prohibits 
the carrying or possession of loaded handguns within national parks.63  The 
court developed a two-part inquiry for Second Amendment challenges to 
these provisions.64  Applying this framework, the court found that these 
laws withstand constitutional scrutiny, even assuming the laws burden con-
duct within the Second Amendment’s scope.65 
                                                          
 56.  Id. at 3050. 
 57.  Id. (“In Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a hand-
gun in the home for the purpose of self-defense.”). 
 58.  Id. at 3047 (“We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such 
longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.’  We repeat those assurances here.”) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
626–27 (2008)) (citation omitted). 
 59.  Id. at 3048 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599). 
 60.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). 
 61.  36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (2013). 
 62.  See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (making it unlawful to possess a firearm or ammunition for 
persons convicted of crimes punishable by longer than one year of imprisonment); id. § 922(g)(3) 
(same for illegal drug users or addicts); id. § 922(g)(8) (same for persons subject to certain domes-
tic violence protection orders); id. § 922(g)(9) (same for domestic violence misdemeanants). 
 63.  36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b). 
 64.  See infra text accompanying notes 71–75. 
 65.  See infra Part II.B. 
 42 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 73:35 
1. The Fourth Circuit Has Upheld Numerous Federal Gun 
Dispossession Laws Against Second Amendment Challenge 
In United States v. Chester,66 the Fourth Circuit faced the issue of 
whether a federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by domestic vio-
lence misdemeanants impermissibly burdened the misdemeanant’s Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.67  Initially, the court remanded the 
case to develop the record further with regard to the contours of the Second 
Amendment claim and for the district court to determine and apply the ap-
propriate degree of means-end scrutiny.68  Acting on a petition for panel re-
hearing, the court vacated this decision “to provide district courts in this 
Circuit guidance on the framework for deciding Second Amendment chal-
lenges.”69  The court then adopted a two-part inquiry for Second Amend-
ment claims.70  The first part addresses the Second Amendment’s scope and 
asks “‘whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling 
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.’”71  The court as-
serted that this inquiry is historical in nature and seeks to determine whether 
the burdened conduct was within the scope of Second Amendment protec-
tion at the time the Amendment was ratified.72 
If the conduct falls within the Second Amendment’s historically un-
derstood scope, or the government cannot prove that the conduct is categor-
ically excluded, “then we move to the second step of applying an appropri-
ate form of means-end scrutiny.”73  The court, choosing among the forms of 
heightened scrutiny,74 concluded that intermediate scrutiny was more ap-
propriate because of the appellant’s criminal history as a domestic violence 
misdemeanant.75  The court noted that strict scrutiny is not appropriate 
                                                          
 66.  628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 67.  Id. at 677–78. 
 68.  United States v. Chester, 367 F. App’x 392, 398–99 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), vacated, 628 
F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010).  For a more detailed discussion of the degrees of scrutiny, see Russell 
W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 
449 (1988) (“Means-end scrutiny is an analytical process involving examination of the purposes 
(ends) which conduct is designed to serve and the methods (means) chosen to further those pur-
poses.”). 
 69.  Chester, 628 F.3d at 678. 
 70.  Id. at 680. 
 71.  Id. at 680 (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. (citing Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89). 
 74.  See id. at 682 (stating that Heller indicated rational-basis review does not apply when 
reviewing a law that burdens conduct protected under the Second Amendment, and that, therefore, 
the court’s task was to “select between strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny”). 
 75.  Id. at 682–83 (“[W]e believe his claim is not within the core right identified in Heller—
the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense—by 
virtue of Chester’s criminal history as a domestic violence misdemeanant.”).  The court looked to 
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“whenever a law impinges upon a right specifically enumerated in the Bill 
of Rights”; rather, “the level of scrutiny . . . depends on the nature of the 
conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law bur-
dens the right.”76 
In United States v. Staten,77 the court picked up where the Chester 
court left off.78  The court had to determine whether the government estab-
lished that there was a reasonable fit between the statute and a substantial 
governmental interest.79  The court first found that the government estab-
lished that it had a substantial interest in reducing domestic gun violence.80  
Moving to the reasonable fit analysis, the court first explored the precise 
contours of the challenged statute and determined that “the question we 
must resolve under the reasonable fit inquiry is whether the government has 
carried its burden of establishing a reasonable fit between the substantial 
governmental objective of reducing domestic gun violence and the keeping 
of firearms out of the hands of” domestic violence misdemeanants.81  The 
government relied extensively on scholarly social science articles and re-
ports discussing domestic violence and its connection with firearms use to 
establish that there was a reasonable fit between the challenged statute and 
the substantial governmental interest.82  Based on these facts and the narrow 
sweep of the statute, the court ruled that the government satisfied its bur-
den.83 
In United States v. Carter,84 the Fourth Circuit was faced with another 
Second Amendment challenge to a federal statute that prohibited “firearm 
possession by a person ‘who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any con-
                                                          
the levels of scrutiny used in the First Amendment context, which it found to be analogous.  Id. at 
682. 
 76.  Id.  Having outlined the analytical framework and identified the appropriate standard of 
review, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.  Id. at 
683.  The court observed that the government provided numerous reasons why there was a rea-
sonable fit, but the government did not provide sufficient evidence to prove the fit was reasonable.  
Id. 
 77.  666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 78.  Id. at 161. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 161–62. 
 81.  Id. at 162. 
 82.  Id. at 163–67 (“To summarize, the government has established that: (1) domestic vio-
lence is a serious problem in the United States; (2) the rate of recidivism among domestic violence 
misdemeanants is substantial; (3) the use of firearms in connection with domestic violence is all 
too common; (4) the use of firearms in connection with domestic violence increases the risk of 
injury or homicide during a domestic violence incident; and (5) the use of firearms in connection 
with domestic violence often leads to injury or homicide.”). 
 83.  Id. at 167–68. 
 84.  669 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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trolled substance.’”85  Here, the court relied on the two-part analysis it cre-
ated in Chester.86  Despite the government’s contention that “dangerous and 
non-law-abiding citizens are categorically excluded from the historical 
scope” of the right to bear arms, the court, as it had done on three prior oc-
casions, assumed that the statute burdened Carter’s Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense within the home.87  The court 
determined that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate degree of review 
because, as in Chester, Carter’s right did not lie at the Second Amend-
ment’s core.88  The court concluded that crime prevention was an important 
governmental goal, but found that the government did not carry its burden 
to satisfy the reasonable fit inquiry.89  The court stated that the government 
“may resort to a wide range of sources, such as legislative text and history, 
empirical evidence, case law, and common sense,”90 but it “may not rely 
upon mere ‘anecdote and supposition.’”91  The court then remanded the 
case back to the district court for further proceedings.92 
2. The Fourth Circuit Has Encountered a Single Case Involving a 
Second Amendment Challenge Outside of the Home 
In United States v. Masciandaro,93 the Fourth Circuit was confronted 
with a Second Amendment challenge to a federal statute forbidding the pos-
session of loaded handguns in motor vehicles within national parks.94  The 
court recognized that “a considerable degree of uncertainty remains as to 
the scope of [the Second Amendment] beyond the home and the standards 
for determining whether and how the right can be burdened by governmen-
tal regulation.”95  While the court did not expressly adopt the two-part 
                                                          
 85.  Id. at 413 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2012)). 
 86.  Id. at 415–16 (“We first applied Heller in United States v. Chester where we adopted . . . 
a two-step approach for evaluating a statute under the Second Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
 87.  Id. at 416 (“Under the first step, we have three times deferred reaching any conclusion 
about the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection. . . .  [A]gain we will assume that Carter’s 
circumstances implicate the Second Amendment . . . .”) (citing to United States v. Chester, 628 
F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 88.  Id. at 416–17 (“But Carter cannot claim to be a law-abiding citizen, and therefore his as-
serted Second Amendment right cannot be a core right, as we held in Chester, where we conclud-
ed that the defendant’s status as a domestic violence misdemeanant rendered his claim ‘not within 
the core right identified in Heller.’” (quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 682–83)). 
 89.  Id. at 417–19.  The court noted that the government, relying instead on common sense, 
provided no studies, empirical data, or legislative findings to prove reasonable fit.  Id. at 419. 
 90.  Id. at 418 (citing Staten, 666 F.3d at 160–61, 167–68). 
 91.  Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000)). 
 92.  Id. at 421. 
 93.  638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 94.  Id. at 465 (addressing a Second Amendment challenge to 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (2013)). 
 95.  Id. at 467. 
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Chester inquiry for laws burdening the purported Second Amendment right 
outside the home, it did perform a substantively similar analysis.96 
Because the conduct was not within the Second Amendment’s core, 
the court concluded that a showing of less than strict scrutiny was “neces-
sary with respect to laws that burden the right to keep and bear arms outside 
of the home.”97  In reaching this determination, the court relied on a 
longstanding distinction between the scope of firearm rights outside the 
home as opposed to inside the home.98  The court, invoking the principle of 
constitutional avoidance,99 found that it need not decide whether the Heller 
right applied outside the home; and even assuming it did apply, the regula-
tion still withstood intermediate scrutiny.100  The court also stated that “in-
termediate scrutiny does not require that a regulation be the least intrusive 
means of achieving the relevant government objective, or that there be no 
burden whatsoever on the individual right in question.”101 
C. Other Courts Have Adopted Similar Approaches to Second 
Amendment Challenges to State Firearm Regulations 
Although Woollard presented the Fourth Circuit with an issue of first 
impression, other federal courts have faced this same issue.  The Second 
Circuit upheld the proper cause requirement of New York’s handgun per-
mitting scheme against a Second Amendment challenge.102  The Seventh 
Circuit, however, struck down an Illinois statute that effectively was a 
wholesale ban on handguns.103  After the Fourth Circuit issued its Woollard 
decision, the Third Circuit upheld New Jersey’s permitting regime, while 
the Ninth Circuit held unconstitutional San Diego County’s interpretation of 
                                                          
 96.  See id. at 475 (stating that it is not necessary to determine the applicability of the Heller 
right outside the home because the statute withstands the applicable level of scrutiny). 
 97.  Id. at 471.  Therefore, the government was required to show that the statute was “reason-
ably adapted to a substantial government interest.”  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 470. 
 99.  Constitutional avoidance is the principle that, when reviewing statutes and regulations, a 
court should avoid making decisions on constitutional grounds whenever possible.  Michael C. 
Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 254 (1994). 
 100.  Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475 (“There may or may not be a Second Amendment right in 
some places beyond the home, but we have no idea what those places are, what the criteria for 
selecting them should be, [or] what sliding scales of scrutiny might apply to them . . . .  The whole 
matter strikes us as a vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only 
then by small degree.”).  Finding constitutional avoidance inappropriate in this case, Judge Nie-
meyer concluded that “Masciandaro’s claim to self-defense . . . does implicate the Second 
Amendment, albeit subject to lawful limitations.”  Id. at 468 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting in part). 
 101.  Id. at 474 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 847 (4th Cir. 
1995)). 
 102.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 103.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
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California’s permitting scheme.104  Each court engaged in an analysis simi-
lar to the Fourth Circuits two-part Chester inquiry.105 
1. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals Upheld New York’s 
Handgun-Permitting Scheme Against a Second Amendment 
Challenge 
In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester,106 the Second Circuit ad-
dressed whether a New York “handgun licensing scheme violate[d] the 
Second Amendment by requiring an applicant to demonstrate ‘proper 
cause’ to obtain a license to carry a concealed handgun in public.”107  As 
defined by New York case law, to establish proper cause, “an applicant 
must ‘demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from 
that of the general community or of persons engaged in the same profes-
sion.’”108  At the outset, the court acknowledged that the scope of the Sec-
ond Amendment right was undefined but conceded that it “must have some 
application in the very different context of the public possession of fire-
arms.”109  In an effort to determine whether the New York statute burdened 
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection, the court 
examined several nineteenth-century state courts’ treatment of restrictions 
on public carrying of weapons.110  This examination proved inconclusive, 
however.  It demonstrated that, historically, there has been frequent disa-
greement among the states as to the scope of the Second Amendment with 
respect to public carrying of firearms.111  The court also was hesitant to im-
port First Amendment prior-restraint jurisprudence and adapt it to the Sec-
ond Amendment context.112 
Nonetheless, because the court assumed that the Second Amendment 
had some application in this context, the court turned to the question of 
what level of judicial scrutiny applied to the New York statute.113  The 
court concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard be-
                                                          
 104.  See infra Parts II.C.3–4. 
 105.  See infra Parts II.C.1–4. 
 106.  701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). 
 107.  Id. at 83.  Specifically, “[t]hat section provides that a license ‘shall be issued to . . . have 
and carry [a firearm] concealed . . . by any person when proper cause exists for the issuance there-
of.’”  Id. at 86 (alterations in original) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 
2008)). 
 108.  Id. at 86.  Proper cause is not established by a generalized desire for self-protection or by 
“living or being employed in a ‘high crime area[].’”  Id. at 86–87 (alteration in original). 
 109.  Id. at 89 (“What we know . . . is that Second Amendment guarantees are at their zenith 
within the home.” (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008))). 
 110.  Id. at 90–91. 
 111.  Id. at 90–92. 
 112.  Id. at 91–92.  The court also noted that no other court has done so.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 93. 
 2014] WOOLLARD V. GALLAGHER 47 
cause “state regulation of the use of firearms in public was ‘enshrined 
with[in] the scope’ of the Second Amendment when it was adopted.”114  
Precedent dictated, and the parties agreed: “New York ha[d] substantial, in-
deed compelling, governmental interests in public safety and crime preven-
tion.”115  Therefore, the court was left to determine whether the proper 
cause requirement survived intermediate scrutiny.116  In making this deter-
mination, the court need only find that there was a reasonable fit between 
the challenged regulation and the governmental interest.117  The court found 
that, by limiting the restriction only to those who could not establish a 
proper cause, the New York statute survived intermediate scrutiny.118  The 
court also deferred to the legislature to weigh the competing data and stud-
ies as to the effect of regulating public handgun possession.119  The court 
concluded that its “review of the history and tradition of firearm regulation 
does not ‘clearly demonstrate[]’ that limiting handgun possession in public 
to those who show a special need for self-protection is inconsistent with the 
Second Amendment.”120 
2. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Employed an Analysis 
Similar to the Fourth Circuit’s Chester Analysis and Invalidated 
a General Ban on Public Handgun Possession 
In Moore v. Madigan,121 the Seventh Circuit was faced with a consoli-
dated appeal of Second Amendment challenges to an Illinois statute that 
generally prohibited a person from carrying in public “a gun ready to use 
(loaded, immediately accessible—that is, easy to reach—and uncased).”122  
The court first employed a historical and textual inquiry into the Second 
Amendment’s scope.123  As a result, the court found implicit within the Su-
preme Court’s Heller and McDonald decisions the proposition “that the 
constitutional right of armed self-defense is broader than the right to have a 
                                                          
 114.  Id. at 96 (alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634).  The court also relied 
on a perceived inside-the-home or outside-the-home dichotomy when selecting intermediate scru-
tiny over strict scrutiny.  Id. at 96. 
 115.  Id. at 97. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 118.  Id. at 98. 
 119.  Id. at 99. 
 120.  Id. at 101 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012)). 
 121.  702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 708 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 122.  Id. at 934. 
 123.  Id. at 935–37.  Although Heller and McDonald found that the Second Amendment pro-
tection is most acute within the home, this does not mean that it is confined to the home or that it 
is not acute outside the home.  Id. at 935. 
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gun in one’s home.”124  The court further found that “[t]o confine the right 
to be armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the 
right of self-defense described in Heller and McDonald.”125 
The court then turned to the second part of its inquiry.  Without estab-
lishing the appropriate level of heightened scrutiny, the court found that Il-
linois failed to satisfy even intermediate scrutiny.126  A state cannot justify a 
statute that burdens a constitutional right on the basis that it is not irrational, 
particularly where empirical literature fails to conclusively establish an ad-
equate justification for the law.127  Yet the court implied that meeting in-
termediate scrutiny still may not have been sufficient for the statute to pass 
constitutional muster.128  The court went on to distinguish the statute under 
review from one in which a state bans guns in a particular place because “a 
person can preserve an undiminished right of self-defense by not entering 
those places; since that’s a lesser burden, the state doesn’t need to prove so 
strong a need.”129 
The Seventh Circuit also addressed the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Kachalsky.130  While expressing reservations about the Second Circuit’s 
analysis, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Kachalsky to the extent that, in 
the present case, “our analysis is not based on degrees of scrutiny, [as was 
the case in Kachalsky] but on Illinois’s failure to justify the most restrictive 
gun law of any of the 50 states.”131  The court then remanded the consoli-
dated cases for entry of permanent injunctions against the state.132 
                                                          
 124.  Id. at 935–36 (“A right to bear arms . . . implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the 
home.”). 
 125.  Id. at 937. 
 126.  See id. at 942 (stating “Illinois had to provide us with more than merely a rational basis 
for believing that its uniquely sweeping ban is justified by an increase in public safety”). 
 127.  Id. at 939. 
 128.  See id. at 940 (asserting Illinois “would have to make a stronger showing in this case than 
the government did in [United States v.] Skoien, because the curtailment of gun rights was much 
narrower: there the gun rights of persons convicted of domestic violence, here the gun rights of the 
entire law-abiding adult population of Illinois” (citation omitted)). 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 941. 
 131.  Id. (“Our principal reservation about the Second Circuit’s analysis . . . is its suggestion 
that the Second Amendment should have much greater scope inside the home than outside simply 
because other provisions of the Constitution have been held to make that distinction.”). 
 132.  Id. at 942. 
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3. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals Upheld New Jersey’s 
Permitting Scheme Against a Second Amendment Challenge 
In Drake v. Filko,133 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit was faced with a Second Amendment challenge to New Jersey’s 
handgun permitting scheme.134  New Jersey’s statutory scheme requires, 
among other things, that the applicant “‘has a justifiable need to carry a 
handgun.’”135  Applicants must submit evidence of justifiable need detailing 
“‘the urgent necessity for self-protection, as evidenced by specific threats or 
previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the applicant’s life 
that cannot be avoided by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry 
a handgun.’”136  The court, relying on the two-part analysis it adopted in 
United States v. Marzzarella,137 sought to determine the constitutionality of 
this permitting scheme by determining whether the statute burdens conduct 
“‘falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee’” and, if 
so, by then evaluating the law under the appropriate level of scrutiny.138 
Proceeding with its analysis, the court conceded that the individual 
right to bear arms for self-defense may apply outside the home, but stopped 
short of making such a declaration.139  Nevertheless, the court found that 
the provisions of New Jersey’s handgun permitting scheme fell outside the 
Second Amendment’s scope by virtue of being a “longstanding,” “presump-
tively lawful” regulation.140  Such regulations are an exception to the Sec-
ond Amendment’s guarantee due to their enduring and consistent nature.141  
The court, nonetheless, proceeded to the second step of its analysis due to 
this area of the law’s “critical importance.”142 
Assuming that the New Jersey statute burdened conduct that fell with-
in the Second Amendment’s scope, the court determined that the provisions 
would withstand constitutional scrutiny.143  The court determined that in-
termediate scrutiny—the requirement that there is a reasonable fit between 
the challenged statute and an important government interest144—was appro-
                                                          
 133.  724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 117970 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2014) 
(No. 13-827).  The Third Circuit’s opinion was filed July 31, 2013, four months after the Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion in Woollard on March 21, 2013. 
 134.  Id. at 428. 
 135.  Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4(c) (West 2005)). 
 136.  Id. (quoting N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:54-2.4(d)(1) (2014)). 
 137.  614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 138.  Drake, 724 F.3d at 429 (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89). 
 139.  Id. at 431. 
 140.  Id. at 431–32. 
 141.  Id. at 432. 
 142.  Id. at 434–35. 
 143.  Id. at 435. 
 144.  Id. at 436. 
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priate because strict scrutiny is only appropriate when the government im-
poses restrictions on the core of the right—“the right to possess usable 
handguns in the home for self-defense.”145  Applying intermediate scrutiny, 
the court first found that New Jersey’s interest in protecting public safety 
was an important governmental interest.146  Next, turning to the reasonable 
fit inquiry, the court noted that “courts ‘accord substantial deference to the 
[legislature’s] predictive judgments.’”147  Although there was no history in-
dicating the New Jersey legislature’s basis for enacting the statute, the court 
relied on the statute’s longevity and the reasonable inference that requiring 
particularized need for permit issuance serves the governmental interest of 
public safety.148  Finally, the court found that the New Jersey statute did not 
burden more conduct than reasonably necessary to accomplish New Jer-
sey’s goal of protecting public safety.149  The court concluded that New Jer-
sey’s permitting scheme was constitutional because the challenged provi-
sion did not burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment and, 
assuming it did, the provision survives intermediate scrutiny.150 
4. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Held Unconstitutional a 
California County’s Interpretation of the State’s Licensing 
Statute 
In Peruta v. County of San Diego,151 the Ninth Circuit addressed a 
Second Amendment challenge to San Diego County’s policy interpretation 
of California’s handgun permitting scheme.152  California law requires, 
among other things, that a concealed carry permit applicant establish “good 
cause” and “delegates to each city and county the power to issue written 
policy setting forth the procedures for obtaining” a permit.153  San Diego 
County’s interpretation of the good-cause requirement obligates the appli-
cant to distinguish himself from the populace; a general concern for self-
protection is insufficient.154  The court embarked on a two-step inquiry to 
                                                          
 145.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 146.  Id. at 437. 
 147.  Id. at 436–37 (alteration in original) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 
180, 195 (1997)). 
 148.  Id. at 437–38. 
 149.  Id. at 439–40. 
 150.  Id. at 440. 
 151.  No. 10-56971, 2014 WL 555862 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014).  The Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
was filed February 13, 2014, eleven months after the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Woollard on 
March 21, 2013. 
 152.  Id. at *2. 
 153.  Id. at *1 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26150, 26155 (West 2012)). 
 154.  Id. 
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determine whether the burdened conduct was within the Second Amend-
ment’s scope and, if so, whether the county’s policy infringed that right.155 
Addressing the first part of the inquiry, the court engaged in a textual 
and historical analysis to determine whether the Second Amendment pro-
tected the right of a “responsible, law-abiding citizen[] . . . to carry a gun 
outside the home for self-defense.”156  This analysis led the court to con-
clude that the burdened conduct was within the Second Amendment’s 
scope.157  According to the court, this examination is of critical importance 
for determining whether a permitting requirement passes constitutional 
muster.158 
Turning to the second part of its inquiry, the court sought to determine 
whether the challenged requirement infringed the Second Amendment.159  
At the outset, the court questioned whether the good-cause requirement 
amounted to a total destruction of the right “to bear arms in public for the 
lawful purpose of self-defense” for a “typical responsible, law-abiding citi-
zen.”160  Because the good-cause requirement was not satisfied by a general 
concern for personal safety, the typical responsible, law-abiding citizen was 
not permitted to publicly bear arms.161  Accordingly, the court determined 
that San Diego County’s “good cause” policy interpretation infringes the 
Second Amendment.162  The Ninth Circuit did not have to venture into the 
ambit of tiered scrutiny because a regulation that destroys a constitutional 
right cannot pass muster under any degree of constitutional scrutiny.163 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Woollard v. Gallagher, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland, concluding that the good-and-substantial-reason 
                                                          
 155.  Id. at *3, *19 (citing United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013)).  In 
Chovan, the Ninth Circuit adopted the two-part Chester inquiry for Second Amendment challeng-
es.  735 F.3d at 1136. 
 156.  Peruta, 2014 WL 555862, at *3. 
 157.  Id. at *18. 
 158.  Id. at *19. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at *20 (“[T]he question is not whether the California scheme (in light of San Diego 
County’s policy) allows some people to bear arms outside the home in some places at some 
times.”). 
 161.  Id. at *21 (“[A] typical citizen fearing for his ‘personal safety’—by definition—cannot 
‘distinguish [himself] from the mainstream.’”). 
 162.  Id. at *30.  The Second Amendment does not require that states allow concealed carry; 
however, it “does require that the states permit some form of carry for self-defense outside the 
home.”  Id. at *24. 
 163.  Id. at *18. 
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requirement was reasonably adapted to Maryland’s substantial interests in 
protecting public safety and preventing crime.164 
In reaching its decision, the court acknowledged that the scope of the 
Second Amendment right articulated by the Supreme Court in Heller165 was 
uncertain.166  The Fourth Circuit, however, found that it was unnecessary to 
delineate the bounds of the Second Amendment’s protection to dispose of 
this case.167  Instead, the court assumed, without finding, that the Heller 
right extends outside the home and that the statute, as applied in Woollard, 
infringed that right.168 
The court reiterated that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate 
standard of review for laws “that burden [any] right to keep and bear arms 
outside the home.”169  Therefore, the challenged statute must be reasonably 
adapted to meet a substantial government interest to pass constitutional 
muster.170  The court, citing codified legislative findings and crime statis-
tics, found that Maryland’s interests in public safety and preventing crime 
satisfied the “significant governmental interest” prong of intermediate scru-
tiny.171  The court rejected Woollard’s attempts to invoke strict scrutiny—
                                                          
 164.  712 F.3d 865, 882–83 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). 
 165.  554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).  Moreover,  
[t]he Heller Court concluded that the District of Columbia’s outright ban on the posses-
sion of an operable handgun in the home—proscribing “the most preferred firearm in 
the nation to keep and use for protection of one’s home and family”—would fail to pass 
muster “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights.”   
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 874 (alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29). 
 166.  Woollard, 712 F.3d at 874.  The court recognized that “a considerable degree of uncer-
tainty remains as to the scope of [the Heller] right beyond the home and the standards for deter-
mining whether and how the right can be burdened by governmental regulation.”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 167.  Id. at 874–76 (“We hew to a judicious course today, refraining from any assessment of 
whether Maryland’s good-and-substantial-reason requirement for obtaining a handgun permit im-
plicates Second Amendment protections.”). 
 168.  Id.  
 169.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470–71). 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 876–78.  The Maryland legislature found that: 
(1) the number of violent crimes committed in the State has increased alarmingly in re-
cent years; (2) a high percentage of violent crimes committed in the State involves the 
use of handguns; (3) the result is a substantial increase in the number of deaths and in-
juries largely traceable to the carrying of handguns in public places by criminals; (4) 
current law has not been effective in curbing the more frequent use of handguns in 
committing crime; and (5) additional regulations on the wearing, carrying, and trans-
porting of handguns are necessary to preserve the peace and tranquility of the State and 
to protect the rights and liberties of the public. 
Id. at 876–77 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-202 (LexisNexis 2012)). 
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namely that the right to bear arms for self-defense outside the home was a 
fundamental right.172 
The court then addressed the second prong of its intermediate scrutiny 
analysis, finding that there was a reasonable fit between the good-and-
substantial-reason requirement and Maryland’s governmental interests.173  
The court articulated several reasons why the requirement advanced Mary-
land’s governmental interests of public safety and crime prevention by de-
creasing the number of handguns carried in public.174  The court further 
found that the permitting regime did not overreach because it allowed the 
issuance of permits to those with a profound need for self-protection.175  
The court reinforced its analysis by citing the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals’s decision in Kachalsky as support.176 
Finally, the court confronted the lower court’s analysis.177  The Fourth 
Circuit stated that the district court misapplied the intermediate scrutiny 
standard.178  The appeals court found that the district court engaged in a 
more sweeping review, such that the lower court’s analysis more closely re-
sembled strict scrutiny.179  The court, assuming a more obsequious position, 
deferred to the “considered judgment of the General Assembly that the 
good-and-substantial-reason requirement strikes an appropriate balance be-
tween granting handgun permits to those persons known to be in need of 
self-protection and precluding a dangerous proliferation of handguns on the 
streets of Maryland.”180  In accordance with its finding that Maryland’s 
permitting regime survived intermediate scrutiny, the Fourth Circuit re-
versed the district court’s judgment.181 
                                                          
 172.  Id. at 877–78. 
 173.  Id. at 880. 
 174.  Id. at 879–80.  Among other things, the statute “[d]ecreas[es] the availability of handguns 
to criminals via theft, [l]essen[s] ‘the likelihood that basic confrontations between individuals 
would turn deadly,’ [and] [a]vert[s] the confusion . . . that can result from the presence of a third 
person with a handgun during a confrontation between a police officer and a criminal suspect.”  
Id. at 879 (citations omitted). 
 175.  Id. at 880. 
 176.  Id. at 881.  In Kachalsky, the Second Circuit held that “New York’s ‘proper cause’ re-
quirement ‘is oriented to the Second Amendment’s protections,’ and constitutes ‘a more moderate 
approach’ to protecting public safety and preventing crime than a wholesale ban on the public car-
rying of handguns.”  Id. (citing Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 98–99 (2d Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013)). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 881–82. 
 179.  Id. at 882. 
 180.  Id. at 881 (“‘It is the legislature’s job, not ours, to weigh conflicting evidence and make 
policy judgments.’”) (quoting Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 99). 
 181.  Id. at 882–83. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly held constitutional 
Maryland’s good-and-substantial-reason requirement.  The two-part Ches-
ter inquiry provides a flexible framework with which to evaluate laws bur-
dening conduct implicating the Second Amendment.182  Laws burdening 
conduct outside the home usually will be subject to intermediate scrutiny 
due to the right’s subordinate position in the Second Amendment hierar-
chy.183  Maryland’s good-and-substantial-reason requirement withstands in-
termediate scrutiny because the provision is reasonably adapted to the gov-
ernment’s interest in protecting public safety and preventing crime.184  
Handgun-permitting schemes, like Maryland’s, that do not amount to a 
wholesale ban and grant permits to those with a documented, articulable 
need for self-protection should withstand constitutional scrutiny.185 
A.  The Two-Part Chester Inquiry Fills the Void Left by the Supreme 
Court’s Heller Decision 
In Heller, the Supreme Court identified a right at the Second Amend-
ment’s core, but it did not define the scope of the Second Amendment right 
outside of the home.186  The Court left “for future cases the formidable task 
of defining the scope of permissible regulations,”187 without providing 
“clear standards for resolving those challenges.”188  The Fourth Circuit has 
developed a two-part inquiry for examining laws that restrict the Second 
Amendment right inside the home.189  Hesitant to venture unnecessarily into 
the “vast terra incognita” of the Second Amendment’s applicability outside 
of the home, the Fourth Circuit has advanced its Second Amendment juris-
prudence only when necessary and only by small degree.190  Applying the 
                                                          
 182.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 183.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 184.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 185.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 186.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630, 635 (2008) (“But since this case 
represents this Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not ex-
pect it to clarify the entire field . . . .”); see also supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 187.  Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 188.  Id. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 189.  United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 190.  United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011).  For a discussion of the 
Fourth Circuit’s restrained approach, see, e.g., Note, Fourth Circuit Upholds Good-and-
Substantial-Reason Requirement for Concealed Carry Permits, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1480 
(2014) (“After Heller and McDonald, the Fourth Circuit signaled its recognition of the centrality 
of historical inquiries to resolving Second Amendment challenges . . . .  Despite this recognition, 
the court avoided historical analysis altogether in Masciandaro and Woollard, instead simply as-
suming that the right at issue existed before analyzing it under intermediate scrutiny.  The Fourth 
Circuit has defended this approach on constitutional avoidance grounds, declining to enter the 
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two-part Chester analysis to laws burdening conduct outside the home pre-
served the court’s deliberative approach while providing guidance to lower 
courts. 
In addition to the Fourth Circuit, many other circuit courts of appeals, 
relying on the limited framework provided by the Supreme Court in Heller 
and McDonald, have employed the two-part inquiry to evaluate firearm 
regulations.191  This inquiry seeks to determine whether the Second 
Amendment protects the burdened conduct and, if so, whether the chal-
lenged regulation satisfies the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.192  This 
inquiry provides a flexible framework, which allows courts to evaluate a 
Second Amendment challenge based on the nature of the conduct and the 
degree to which the conduct is burdened.193  The inquiry also allows the 
court to avoid the first step’s determination of Second Amendment scope 
outside the home—and the attendant risks accompanying an overbroad rul-
ing194—when the statute nevertheless can survive judicial scrutiny.195  Ad-
ditionally, the court can dispose of the challenge if the burdened conduct is 
excluded categorically from the Second Amendment’s protection.196 
The second prong of the two-part inquiry also is malleable.  It allows 
the court to tailor the degree of scrutiny based upon the extent to which the 
challenged provision burdens protected conduct.197  Although most courts 
                                                          
‘vast terra incognita’ of the Second Amendment’s scope when the case ‘could be resolved on nar-
rower grounds.’”). 
 191.  See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874–75 (4th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases from 
the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits applying the two-part 
inquiry), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). 
 192.  Chester, 628 F.3d at 680. 
 193.  Id. at 682 (“The Second Amendment is no more susceptible to a one-size-fits-all standard 
of review than any other constitutional right.”). 
 194.  See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475 (“This is serious business.  We do not wish to be even 
minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in the peace of our judi-
cial chambers we miscalculated as to Second Amendment rights.”). 
 195.  Id.  But see Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10-56971, 2014 WL 555862, at *19 (9th 
Cir. Feb. 13, 2014) (“Understanding the scope of the right is not just necessary, it is key to our 
analysis.  For if self-defense outside the home is part of the core right to ‘bear arms’ and the Cali-
fornia regulatory scheme prohibits the exercise of that right, no amount of interest-balancing un-
der a heightened form of means-ends scrutiny can justify San Diego County’s policy.”). 
 196.  See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment 
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 405 (2009) (referring to Heller’s “flat exclusion[] of felons, the 
mentally ill, and certain ‘Arms’ from constitutional coverage”); see also Chester, 628 F.3d at 679 
(noting “[s]ome courts have treated Heller’s listing of ‘presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures,’ for all practical purposes, as a kind of ‘safe harbor’ for unlisted regulatory 
measures . . . which they deem to be analogous to those measures specifically listed in Heller.”). 
 197.  See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that strict 
scrutiny does not necessarily apply to all Second Amendment challenges); Chester, 628 F.3d at 
683 (concluding that intermediate scrutiny was more appropriate when a challenged regulation 
does not burden conduct within Heller’s core right). 
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using this approach have applied intermediate scrutiny,198 courts can apply 
a more or less stringent form of scrutiny depending on the magnitude of the 
burden the challenged regulation imparts on the right.199 
Courts use a similar approach under First Amendment jurisprudence, 
where the degree of scrutiny the courts apply depends upon the nature of 
the regulated conduct and the extent to which the challenged provision bur-
dens that conduct.200  Although courts should not adopt First Amendment 
jurisprudence wholesale to shortcut the development of Second Amend-
ment jurisprudence,201 it can provide guideposts for the lower courts until 
the Supreme Court definitively establishes the Second Amendment’s 
bounds.202  In fact, the Supreme Court made several comparisons between 
the First and Second Amendments in its Heller decision.203  The Fourth 
Circuit was correct to extend the two-part Chester inquiry to firearms regu-
lations outside the home because it provides a flexible examination and, de-
spite exploring terra incognita, its application has an inherent familiarity. 
                                                          
 198.  Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do Post-
McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 514 (2012); see also United States v. Skoien, 
614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (observing that many courts apply intermediate scrutiny to Sec-
ond Amendment challenges to federal felon dispossession statutes); cf. District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (finding rational basis review inappropriate for Second 
Amendment challenges). 
 199.  Sobel, supra note 198, at 514. 
 200.  Chester, 628 F.3d at 682. 
 201.  See Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) (“We are hesitant 
to import substantive First Amendment principles wholesale into Second Amendment jurispru-
dence.  Indeed, no court has done so.”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Gregory P. Magari-
an, Speaking the Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. 49, 63 (2012) (emphasizing the different underlying considerations for First and Second 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
 202.  See Blocher, supra note 196, at 381 (stating that free speech doctrine “has been frequent-
ly linked to the Second Amendment”); Magarian, supra note 201, at 72 (“Our understanding of 
the First Amendment can, however, generate other valuable, even decisive, tools for determining 
the shape and legal force of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.”). 
 203.  See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (“Just as the First 
Amendment protects modern forms of communications, . . . the Second Amendment extends, pri-
ma facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at 
the time of the founding.”); id. at 592 (“We look to [the Second Amendment’s historical back-
ground] because it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First 
and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.”); id. at 595 (“Thus, we do not read the 
Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just 
as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”); 
id. at 635 (“Like the First [Amendment], [the Second Amendment] is the very product of an inter-
est balancing by the people . . . .”).  Such analogies have been made for over 200 years.  Eugene 
Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 97 (2009). 
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B.  Intermediate Scrutiny Is the Proper Standard, One That Maryland’s 
Permitting Scheme Satisfies 
In addition to declining to explicate the Second Amendment’s scope, 
the Supreme Court also did not establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating 
Second Amendment challenges to firearms regulations.204  The Court, how-
ever, did disclaim the use of rational basis review because “the Second 
Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibi-
tions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”205  Therefore, courts are 
left to decide between the heightened standards of scrutiny—intermediate 
and strict scrutiny.206  Intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of 
review due to public handgun possession’s subordinate position,207 the flex-
ibility afforded under intermediate scrutiny,208 and its deferential treatment 
of legislative judgments.209 
The closer the burdened conduct lies to the core constitutional right, or 
the greater the law’s burden, the closer the standard of review is to strict 
scrutiny.210  Regulations burdening conduct nearer to the Second Amend-
ment’s periphery, or laws imposing a slight burden, may be justified more 
easily.211  The Heller Court stated that the “core protection” of the Second 
Amendment applies to an individual right to bear arms for self-protection 
within the home.212  Provisions burdening the right to bear arms outside of 
the home are further from the core Heller right and, accordingly, subject to 
a more deferential review than strict scrutiny.213  Outside the home, the 
right to bear arms occupies a subordinate position because it is an area tra-
ditionally subject to government regulation.214  Most courts have applied 
intermediate scrutiny when reviewing statutes in light of a Second Amend-
ment challenge.215 
                                                          
 204.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (stating that the statute “would fail constitutional muster” 
“[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional 
rights”). 
 205.  Id. at 628 n.27. 
 206.  United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 207.  See infra text accompanying note 214. 
 208.  See supra text accompanying note 193. 
 209.  See infra text accompanying note 219. 
 210.  United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 211.  Id. (quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 682). 
 212.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008). 
 213.  Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470. 
 214.  See id. (“[A]s we move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, 
because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.”); Kachalsky v. 
Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[O]ur tradition . . . clearly indicates a sub-
stantial role for state regulation of the carrying of firearms in public . . . .”), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 1806 (2013). 
 215.  Sobel, supra note 198199, at 513. 
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While it is true that “self-defense has to take place wherever [a] person 
happens to be,”216 the Heller Court explicitly disclaimed the use of an “in-
terest-balancing inquiry” when evaluating Second Amendment challenges 
to firearms regulations.217  Intermediate scrutiny, however, does permit 
“clandestine” interest balancing to occur.218  The particular formulation of 
intermediate scrutiny in this instance, while more rigorous than rational ba-
sis scrutiny, nonetheless exhibits a posture that is deferential to legisla-
tors.219  Typically, the court will defer to the predictive judgments of the 
legislature when evaluating the degree of fit between the governmental ob-
jective and the challenged regulation.220  After all, it is the legislature’s duty 
to weigh evidence, assess risks and benefits, and make public-policy deci-
sions.221 
Maryland’s interest in protecting public safety and preventing crime 
were important government interests.222  Due to the prevalence of crime in 
urban environments,223 among other things, protecting public safety and 
preventing crime are important, if not compelling, government interests.224  
Professor Calvin Massey observed that, in the context of strict scrutiny, 
“[t]he government’s compelling purpose will typically be some variation on 
the theme of public safety . . . .  Surely this is a compelling interest.”225  
Similarly, Professor Adam Winkler asserted that “the requirement of a 
compelling government interest[] is likely to be found to be satisfied in 
                                                          
 216.  Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An 
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1515 (2009). 
 217.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35. 
 218.  Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 
1129 (2000). 
 219.  See Richard C. Boldt, Decisional Minimalism and the Judicial Evaluation of Gun Regu-
lations, 71 MD. L. REV. 1177, 1187 (2012) (“The judicial exercise of intermediate scrutiny under 
these circumstances, while not toothless rational basis review, should be characterized by a defer-
ential stance toward the sensitive public policy judgments reached decades ago and maintained 
over the years by officials in the legislative and executive branches of state government.”). 
 220.  Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436–37 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 117970 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2014) (No. 
13-827). 
 221.  Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 1806 (2013). 
 222.  See supra note 171 and accompanying text (noting the Maryland legislature’s finding 
regarding gun-related crime). 
 223.  See Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of 
Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 7–
20 (2009) (discussing a spike in urban crime rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s). 
 224.  See, e.g., Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97 (finding that “New York ha[d] substantial, indeed 
compelling, governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention”). 
 225.  Massey, supra note 218, at 1132.  Professor Massey predicted that “[t]he degree of con-
nection between this laudable objective and the means chosen to achieve it would likely prove to 
be the litigation battleground.”  Id. 
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nearly every case because the interest in public safety (or some variant of 
that goal, such as ‘preventing violence’ or ‘reducing crime’) is so obviously 
important.”226  Professor Eugene Volokh observed that the difference be-
tween important government interest—required under intermediate scruti-
ny—and compelling government interest—required under strict scrutiny—
is not likely to be relevant because “virtually every gun control law is aimed 
at serving interests that would usually be seen as compelling—preventing 
violent crime, injury, and death.”227 
As expected, Maryland’s purported interests were protecting public 
safety and preventing crime.228  The district court acknowledged, “[b]eyond 
peradventure, public safety and the prevention of crime are substantial, in-
deed compelling, government interests.”229  Woollard even conceded “that 
‘a compelling government interest in public safety’ generally exists.”230  
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit “readily”231 and correctly concluded that Mar-
yland’s interests in protecting public safety and preventing crime were im-
portant government interests. 
There was a reasonable fit between the good-and-substantial-reason 
requirement and the State’s interests in protecting public safety and prevent-
ing crime.  To discharge its reasonable fit burden, “the government may not 
rely upon mere ‘anecdote and supposition.’”232  The government must pro-
duce evidence to establish that there is reasonable fit rather than offering 
plausible reasons why the fit is reasonable.233  To that end, the government 
may rely on “a wide range of sources, such as legislative text and history, 
empirical evidence, case law, and common sense, as circumstances and 
context require.”234  In Woollard, the state relied on codified legislative 
findings and declarations by three police commanders with more than one 
hundred years of combined law enforcement experience.235  The evidence 
proffered by the state supports the court’s finding that there was a reasona-
                                                          
 226.  Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 727 (2007). 
 227.  Volokh, supra note 216, at 1470. 
 228.  Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). 
 229.  Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 473 (D. Md. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Woollard 
v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). 
 230.  Woollard, 712 F.3d at 877. 
 231.  Id. (“In these circumstances, we can easily appreciate Maryland’s impetus to enact 
measures aimed at protecting public safety and preventing crime, and we readily conclude that 
such objectives are substantial governmental interests.”). 
 232.  United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 418 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Play-
boy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000)). 
 233.  United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 234.  Carter, 669 F.3d at 418 (citing United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 160–61, 167–68 
(4th Cir. 2011)). 
 235.  Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876–77 & n.6. 
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ble fit between the good-and-substantial-reason requirement and the gov-
ernment’s interest in protecting public safety and preventing crime.236 
The reasonable fit inquiry also accords deference to the considered, 
predictive judgments made by the legislature.237  The court’s “role is . . . ‘to 
assure that, in formulating its judgments, [the legislature] has drawn rea-
sonable inferences based on substantial evidence.’”238  The magnitude of 
deference reflects the longevity and consistency of the provision.239  The 
longevity of Maryland’s permitting regime, dating back to 1972, militates 
in favor of a finding of reasonable fit.240  In addition, there also is an exten-
sive history of firearm regulation by states throughout the United States.241 
A regulation “may be somewhat over-inclusive,” but such an observa-
tion suggests only that the fit is not perfect.242  In fact, “[m]ost legislation 
will assert broad safety concerns and broad gun control measures to match, 
covering both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ gun possessors . . . .  Such legislation can-
not be narrowly tailored to reach only the bad people who kill with their in-
nocent guns.”243  Intermediate scrutiny requires only that the fit be reasona-
ble, not perfect.244  Maryland’s permit scheme provides that an applicant 
shall receive a license if, among other things, he has a good and substantial 
reason.245  Even if this requirement is somewhat over-broad,246 this demon-
strates only that the fit is reasonable, not perfect. 
C. A Developing Split Among the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
Until the Ninth Circuit’s Peruta opinion, the federal circuit courts of 
appeals consistently applied a two-part approach to constitutional challeng-
es to firearms regulations.247  The Seventh Circuit’s Moore analysis fol-
lowed this approach and, despite striking down the statute at issue, does not 
undermine Woollard’s holding.248  Although the Ninth Circuit correctly ar-
                                                          
 236.  See supra notes 171, 174 and accompanying text. 
 237.  Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436–37 (3d Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 
117970 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2014) (No. 13-827). 
 238.  Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). 
 239.  See supra text accompanying note 148. 
 240.  Boldt, supra note 219, at 1186 (citing Md. S.B. 205, 1972 Sess.). 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 167 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 243.  Donald W. Dowd, The Relevance of the Second Amendment to Gun Control Legislation, 
58 MONT. L. REV. 79, 111 (1997). 
 244.  Staten, 666 F.3d at 167. 
 245.  Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 880 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). 
 246.  Boldt, supra note 219, at 1183–84. 
 247.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 248.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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ticulated the inquiry, logical gaps in its analysis and its disregard of the 
constitutional avoidance principle led to an erroneous outcome.249  Conse-
quently, the Fourth Circuit’s decision correctly upheld Maryland’s permit-
ting scheme. 
1. The Second and Third Circuits’ Analyses Echo the Approach 
Followed by the Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit’s Woollard decision is consistent with the Second 
Circuit’s Kachalsky decision and the Third Circuit’s Drake decision.  Alt-
hough the statutory language varied in each case,250 the courts effectively 
were faced with determining the constitutionality of a permitting scheme 
requiring a documented, articulable need for armed self-defense outside the 
home.251  The courts then applied a two-part analysis to determine whether 
the challenged provisions burdened conduct within the Second Amend-
ment’s scope and, if so, whether the challenged provision withstood the ap-
propriate level of judicial scrutiny.252  Without imparting a definitive ruling 
of the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee,253 the courts assumed 
that the provisions burdened conduct protected by the Second Amendment 
and continued with their analyses.254  Recognizing that the burdened con-
duct fell outside the Second Amendment’s core and that public possession 
of firearms traditionally has been subject regulation, the circuit courts con-
cluded that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of judicial 
review.255 
The courts easily dispatched the first prong of intermediate scrutiny, 
finding that each state had a substantial government interest in public safety 
                                                          
 249.  See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 250.  Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (describing New 
York’s proper cause requirement), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 869 
(describing Maryland’s good-and-substantial-reason requirement); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 
428 (3d Cir. 2013) (describing New Jersey’s justifiable need requirement), petition for cert. filed, 
2014 WL 117970 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2014) (No. 13-827). 
 251.  See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 86–87 (requiring more than a generalized desire to carry for 
self-defense); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 870 (requiring more than general fear or a vague threat); 
Drake, 724 F.3d at 428 & n.2 (requiring specific threats or previous attacks). 
 252.  See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 (“What we do not know is the scope of [the Heller] right 
beyond the home and the standards for determining when and how the right can be regulated by a 
government.”); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875 (describing the two-part Chester inquiry); Drake, 724 
F.3d at 429 (describing the two-part Marzzarella inquiry). 
 253.  See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 (finding that the Second Amendment must have some ap-
plication outside the home); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876 (refraining from making any determination 
of applicability); Drake, 724 F.3d at 431–32, 434 (finding that the Second Amendment may have 
some applicability outside the home but, as the target of a presumptively lawful, longstanding 
regulation, the burdened conduct is outside the Second Amendment’s scope). 
 254.  Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Drake, 724 F.3d at 434–35. 
 255.  Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Drake, 724 F.3d at 435–36.  
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and crime prevention.256  Turning to the second prong—substantially relat-
ed or reasonable fit—the Woollard court relied on legislative findings, tes-
timonial evidence, and legislative deference to conclude that there was a 
reasonable fit between the challenged provision and Maryland’s govern-
mental interests.257  The Kachalsky court placed a greater emphasis on leg-
islative deference and cited legislative findings, studies and data, and the 
tradition of state regulation of public firearm possession for concluding that 
the challenged provision was substantially related to New York’s govern-
mental interests.258  The Drake court likewise emphasized the concept of 
legislative deference, even going so far as to excuse the state from putting 
forth evidence to support the legislature’s judgment.259  Instead, the court 
relied on common sense, legislative history, and reasonable inferences.260  
When performing their “reasonable fit” analyses, the three circuit courts al-
so emphasized that the challenged regulations did not amount to complete 
bans because applicants were entitled to a permit if they establish the requi-
site need.261  The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits engaged in substan-
tively similar analyses, deferring to the legislatures’ predictive judgments 
and upholding handgun permitting schemes that generally disallowed a 
permit to issue unless the applicant could establish a documented, articula-
ble need.262 
2. Despite Reaching Opposite Conclusions, the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits’ Decisions Are Not Incompatible 
Although Woollard and Moore reached different conclusions, the cas-
es are reconcilable.  In Moore, the Seventh Circuit proceeded with its analy-
sis in a manner roughly similar to the two-part analysis the Fourth Circuit 
employed in Woollard.263  First, the court examined the scope of the Second 
Amendment, and then it scrutinized the handgun provision.264  Unlike 
Woollard, the Moore court found that, implicit in the Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence, the Second Amendment right does extend outside the home.265  
                                                          
 256.  Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 877; Drake, 724 F.3d at 437. 
 257.  Woollard, 712 F.3d at 878–82. 
 258.  Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97–101. 
 259.  Drake, 724 F.3d at 436–39. 
 260.  Id. at 437–40. 
 261.  Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98–99; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 880–81; Drake, 724 F.3d at 439–
40. 
 262.  See supra Part II.C. 
 263.  Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934–42 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied, 708 F.3d 901 
(7th Cir. 2013). 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  See id. at 937, 942 (“The Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a right 
to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.”). 
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The Seventh Circuit then held that the provision failed to satisfy any level 
of scrutiny greater than rational review.266 
As part of its scrutiny of the Illinois statute, the Seventh Circuit exam-
ined empirical literature to determine whether there was support for the 
provision.267  Unlike the evidence in Woollard, the empirical data was un-
certain as to whether the handgun statute advanced or detracted from Illi-
nois’s governmental interests.268  Accordingly, the Moore court did not pro-
claim an applicable level of scrutiny because Illinois failed to advance 
evidence sufficient to satisfy any standard greater than minimal scrutiny.269 
The principal distinguishing feature between Moore and Woollard is 
breadth of the challenged statute.  The statute in Moore provided for a regu-
latory scheme that effectively amounted to a wholesale ban on the public 
carrying of firearms,270 while Maryland’s handgun permitting scheme 
grants permits to those who can demonstrate a good and substantial rea-
son.271  To be sure, the Seventh Circuit did not foreclose the possibility that 
Illinois could enact a permitting scheme similar to Maryland’s.272  Key to 
the Seventh Circuit’s analysis was Illinois’s failure to justify sufficiently the 
most restrictive statute in the United States.273 
3. The Ninth Circuit Erred in Its Classification of the Conduct at 
Issue and in Its Interpretation of the Challenged Policy 
Exercising judicial restraint and legislative deference, the Fourth Cir-
cuit avoided making the same errors as the Ninth Circuit.  The Ninth Circuit 
used a two-part inquiry that was similar to that used by the Fourth Circuit in 
Woollard.274  The Ninth Circuit went further, however, and found that a 
regulatory scheme that amounts to a wholesale ban on the public carrying 
of firearms necessarily infringes the Second Amendment.275  The Ninth 
Circuit purported to engage in a historical inquiry and found that the Sec-
                                                          
 266.  Id. at 940–42. 
 267.  Id. at 937–39. 
 268.  Id. at 937. 
 269.  See id. at 941 (stating that the court’s analysis was “not based on degrees of scrutiny, but 
on Illinois’s failure to justify the most restrictive gun law of any of the 50 states”). 
 270.  See supra text accompanying note 122. 
 271.  See supra notes 8–14 and accompanying text. 
 272.  See Moore, 702 F.3d at 940–41 (distinguishing the New York statute at issue in Ka-
chalsky from Illinois’s statute); see also Moore v. Madigan, 708 F.3d 901, 903–04 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(order denying rehearing) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (noting that the panel decision leaves open the 
possibility to regulate who may publicly carry firearms). 
 273.  See Moore, 702 F.3d at 941 (emphasizing Illinois’s failure to justify the statute). 
 274.  See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875 (4th Cir.) (describing the two-part Chester 
inquiry), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013); Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10-56971, 2014 
WL 555862, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014) (describing the Ninth Circuit’s methodology). 
 275.  Peruta, 2014 WL 555862, at *18. 
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ond Amendment right applies beyond the home.276  The court then pro-
nounced that the right to bear arms for lawful self-defense in public was 
part of the Second Amendment’s central protection.277  Yet, the Fourth Cir-
cuit, practicing judicial restraint, did not reach the issue of the Second 
Amendment’s scope concerning carrying firearms in public.278  Instead, the 
Fourth Circuit recognized that public carrying of handguns was an area tra-
ditionally subject to regulation and, accordingly, analyzed the challenged 
statute using a measure of deference to legislative judgments.279 
The Ninth Circuit further erred in its classification of San Diego Coun-
ty’s policy interpretation.  The regulations at issue in Woollard and Peruta 
were substantially similar, despite variation in the manner in which the 
governmental entity carries them out.280  Where the Fourth Circuit found 
the challenged regulation to be a moderate approach to handgun permitting, 
the Ninth Circuit chided the regulation as a complete ban on public hand-
gun possession and a destruction of the Second Amendment right.281  The 
Peruta court claimed that the typical, law-abiding citizen was foreclosed 
from exercising his Second Amendment right to publicly carry a handgun 
for self-defense.282  The court overlooked the opportunity for the average, 
law-abiding citizen to obtain a permit, provided he can establish a particu-
larized need.283  By construing the provision narrowly, the Ninth Circuit er-
roneously held San Diego County’s policy interpretation unconstitutional. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court identified the 
core right of the Second Amendment as the right to keep and bear arms in 
the home for self-defense.284  In Woollard v. Gallagher, the Fourth Circuit, 
faced with a Second Amendment challenge to Maryland’s permitting 
scheme, upheld the good-and-substantial-reason requirement.285  Drawing 
from its Second Amendment jurisprudence,286 the Fourth Circuit engaged in 
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a straightforward application of precedent to an issue of first impression.287  
The Fourth Circuit’s decision is consistent with the opinions of other feder-
al courts.288  Although the scope of the Second Amendment right remains 
uncertain, handgun-permitting schemes that grant permits to those citizens 
with a good and substantial reason, proper cause, or justifiable need should 
withstand constitutional scrutiny.289  Handgun regulations that amount to a 
wholesale ban, however, likely will be held unconstitutional.290 
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